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The term market microstructure was coined in 1976 by Mark Garman to define
"moment-to-moment trading activities in asset markets." With the stated goal
of providing insight and testable implications regarding the transaction-to-
transaction nature of realistic exchange processes, Garman examines dealer-
ship and auction models of marketmakers where the stream of market orders
from a collection of market agents is depicted as a stochastic Poisson process.
The resulting insights concern bid-ask spreads (based on standard microeco-
nomic analysis), inventories of marketmakers, and the effects of some market
power on the part of marketmakers.
A more recent microstructure literature is based on information asymmetries
among economic agents. In a recent literature review, Admati (1991) defines
the area of market microstructure as "the literature on asset markets with asym-
metric information and especially on trading mechanisms" (p. 347); Garman
is noted as an example of "earlier market microstructure literature" in which
"information issues were not typically modelled" (p. 355, n. 11). Two reasons
are given for the popularity of asymmetric information models: policy implica-
tions of different trading processes, as exemplified by the 1987 crash, and em-
pirical results such as various patterns in trading volume, variances, and returns
over the trading day. The belief is that better insights into both issues will be
achieved by examining information asymmetries. Moreover, observed empiri-
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cal results are believed to "call for theoretical explanations beyond what can
be obtained by traditional models (in which informational asymmetries are not
present)" (p. 348).
In some ways, foreign exchange data have institutional features that are ideal
for testing these now "standard" asymmetric information models. The market
is very liquid and is linked around the world by computerized information
systems, and the commodity is essentially the same in all markets. Standard
information models have been applied to foreign exchange data in Bollerslev
and Domowitz (1993), particularly to the behavior of bid-ask spreads and vol-
ume around the open and close of trading in regional markets. Bollerslev and
Domowitz conclude that data for smaller banks that "operate mainly within
regional markets with well-defined market openings and closings" (p. 1422)
show the relation between trading activity and spreads that is implied by stan-
dard asymmetric information models.
In this paper, we further examine how well standard asymmetric information
models can explain the behavior of volatility, bid-ask spreads, and volume
around the open and close of trading in foreign exchange markets.
1 We con-
clude that the standard information models are unable to explain these data.
Our analysis differs from most previous studies in that we examine the im-
plications of standard information models for the behavior of data across mar-
kets that are open simultaneously, rather than looking at markets in isolation.
In particular, a feature of standard information models is that high volatility
is associated with trades by privately informed traders whose trading activity
incorporates their information into prices and quotes. Within this class of
model, if new information results in high volatility of quotes for a trader lo-
cated in London, then the quotes for a trader who is physically located in New
York but who observes the London quotes will also show high volatility.
We exploit the fact that foreign exchange transactions occur virtually around
the clock, with overlap between the trading day for traders in London and New
York. Consequently, the open of trade in New York and the close of trade in
London correspond to times when the other market has been trading for some
time. We find that the high volatility that shows up at the open in New York
and the close in London appears to be unrelated to the concurrent volatility in
the other market, even though both sets of quotes appear on exactly the same
trading screens at exactly the same time.
This volatility cannot be due to new information reaching one market but
not the other, within the standard information models. Either these markets
that are ostensibly closely linked are segmented in important ways not recog-
nized in standard models, or some phenomenon other than the incorporation
1. Trading patterns at the open and close of trade have been extensively studied within
asymmetric-information models, primarily with respect to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
but also in the context of cross-country listings and foreign exchange (see, e.g., Admati and
Pfleiderer 1988; Subrahmanyam 1991; Freedman 1989; Barclay, Litzenberger, and Warner 1990;
and Bollerslev and Domowitz 1993). For an excellent survey of the literature, see Admati (1991).43 Bid-Ask Spreads in Foreign Exchange Markets
of private information must be responsible for the behavior of quotes. Given
the high degree of integration of the international foreign exchange market, we
conclude that the observed periodicity of volatility is not due to the incorpora-
tion of private information as envisioned by standard asymmetric information
models. One way of stating the problem is that if no new information is reach-
ing the international foreign exchange market—which is implied by the ab-
sence of unusual volatility in quotes generated by traders in one physical loca-
tion—then quotes generated by traders in another market show excess
volatility relative to that implied by standard information models.
This is not a new phenomenon. For example, the crash of October 1987 is
an example of a large change in stock prices that does not appear to have been
caused by new information reaching the market as a whole. However, a recent
class of model has been developed that explains such phenomena as the crash
in terms of imperfect information aggregation and learning by market partici-
pants rather than new information reaching the market as a whole. These mod-
els differ from standard asymmetric information models by relaxing the as-
sumption that each trader has perfect knowledge about the structure of the
market, that is, about the preferences and beliefs of all traders in the market.
2
While this is a different type of model from standard asymmetric informa-
tion models, it is possible that at least some of the observed behavior in foreign
exchange markets may be attributable to this type of information asymmetry.
We examine this possibility below, after closely examining the standard asym-
metric information models. It appears that some form of learning about the
market structure is important at the start of trading, which results in wide and
volatile quotes when traders first enter the market. This process may be as
informal as the posting of wide quotes with little expectation of trading during
the initial period of learning.
At the close of trading, standard information models are again unable to
explain the foreign exchange data. We conclude that inventory management by
marketmakers in the closing market appears to be the most likely explanation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 discusses the institutional fea-
tures of our data and presents our empirical results. Section 2.2 examines the
standard asymmetric information models of intraday price and volume of Ad-
mati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Subrahmanyam (1989, 1991) and the current
application of these models to foreign exchange data in Bollerslev and Do-
mowitz (1993).
3 Section 2.3 examines alternate explanations of the results in
2. These issues are addressed in Gennotte and Leland (1990), Jacklin, Kleidon, and Pfleiderer
(1992), Kleidon (1992, 1995), and Romer (1993).
3. Foster and Viswanathan (1990) present a related asymmetric information model that focuses
on interday rather than intraday variations in price and volume. Although it can be argued that
foreign exchange trading is not tied to any particular "day," our current focus is on behavior be-
tween the open and the close of usual trading hours for traders within the geographic markets of
London and New York. Foster and Viswanathan examine the behavior of trading across days,
particularly the effects of weekends on Monday trading.44 David A. Hsieh and Allan W. Kleidon
section 2.1, namely, recent learning models based on asymmetric information
and other market microstructure models that place more emphasis on the roles
of market power and inventory management of marketmakers. Section 2.4 con-
tains concluding remarks.
2.1 Data and Results
This section examines the behavior of spreads and quote volatilities across
different regional foreign exchange markets at the same point in time. We dem-
onstrate that a key implication of standard asymmetric information models is
rejected in foreign exchange data, namely, that periods of high variance corre-
spond to periods of high concentration of informed trading. When one regional
market has high variance (i.e., open and close of the regional market with con-
current high bid-ask spreads), other markets simultaneously have low variance
(and low bid-ask spreads), even though the traders from different markets are
connected by computer terminals with all quotes appearing simultaneously
on all terminals. In section 2.2, we interpret these results as showing that what-
ever the explanations for these phenomena—and we suggest possibilities in
section 2.3 below—they are not consistent with current standard models of
asymmetric information.
2.1.1 Data
The foreign exchange market can be roughly divided into two groups.
4 The
first group comprises marketmakers or the interbank market, which accounts
for most foreign exchange trading.
5 Marketmakers deal with each other
through a very active computerized market that trades virtually around the
clock, either directly or through interdealer brokers. The second group com-
prises the retail market or customers who approach a local broker or bank and
are offered retail foreign exchange quotes by that retail bank.
The interbank foreign exchange market, from which our data are obtained,
comprises a network of major trading banks throughout the world that are
linked interactively via computer screens (either Reuters or Telerate systems).
We use data from the Reuters indications system which transmits computer-
ized quotes among interbank dealers. When a trading bank individually up-
dates its quotes, the new quotes directly appear on the screens of all traders
around the world. Actual trades are consummated via telephone,
6 and price and
4. For an excellent description of the markets, see Burnham (1989). See also Goodhart (1990),
Goodhart and Figliuoli (1991), Lyons (1992, 1993, 1995), and Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993).
5. Lyons (1993, 2), citing the New York Federal Reserve Bank, states that over 80 percent of
trading volume is between marketmakers.
6. Lyons (1995) examines data for a single marketmaker from the Reuters Dealing 2000 System
that allows screen trading, although direct telephone communication was necessary for all traders
when our data were collected. Since our approach requires cross-market comparisons, the new
data set is insufficient for our purposes. It will be useful to replicate our study using data from the
new Reuters system, if sufficient data ultimately become available.45 Bid-Ask Spreads in Foreign Exchange Markets
volume for direct interdealer trades are not publicly revealed. Some informa-
tion about brokered interdealer trades, namely, price, quantity, and whether the
trade is at the bid or the ask, is publicly disseminated to dealers via an intercom
system. Major trading banks often perform both interbank and retail roles, with
a dedicated foreign exchange desk within the bank linked to the interbank mar-
ket and with retail customers who are offered quotes that consist of the dealers'
interbank quotes plus an additional markup.
The deutsche mark/dollar data that we use were originally captured from a
Reuters data feed by Charles Goodhart and cover the eighty-two days from 9
April to 30 June 1989. These are the same data used by Bollerslev and Domo-
witz (1993), who provide valuable descriptions of the characteristics of these
data.
7 For our purposes, we concentrate on two markets—London and New
York—but our analysis applies to the other markets documented in Bollerslev
and Domowitz. Figures 2.1a and 2.1b document the time periods in which
significant trading activity takes place in London and New York, respectively.
These figures give the average number of quote arrivals on Reuters' screens,
per five-minute intervals, from traders based in London and New York.
8 Each
location has activity beginning around 7:00 A.M. (local time) and lasting until
about 6:00 P.M. (local time).
9 Figure 2.2 integrates the London and New York
data by converting the Eastern Standard Time (EST) New York times to Green-
wich Mean Time (GMT) and plotting both figures 2.1a and figure 2.1b to-
gether. As noted by Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993, 1426), trading activity
(as measured by the number of quote arrivals) in London begins high, declines
until New York opens, then increases until the close of London trade. Activity
in New York roughly follows that of London but continues strongly after the
London close as New York becomes the major open market.
We wish to highlight several aspects of these data that make them excellent
for studying models of asymmetric information. First, the interbank market is
the closest to an ideal twenty-four-hour market of which we know. It is very
liquid, especially by comparison with stock markets, in terms of both volume
of trade and number of traders; individual traders have continuous access to
the market via computer terminal; and some trader is active virtually around
the clock (including the markets in the Far East). Second, the commodity is
essentially the same in all markets: the deutsche mark and the dollar are the
same irrespective of trader location, and settlement issues are trivial by com-
parison with, say, transactions on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) ver-
7. The data were kindly forwarded to us by Tim Bollerslev and Ian Domowitz. For details of
the data capture, error screens, and data characteristics, see Goodhart (1990) and Goodhart and
Figliuoli (1991).
8. We exclude quotes from Saturday and Sunday since there is almost no trading on these days
(except the last hour on Sunday).
9. There are isolated quotes at times outside this interval, but they are negligible in frequency,
and we ignore them in subsequent analysis. Note also that in London there is one period shortly
before 6:00 P.M. (GMT) in which there are no quotes; this is reflected in figures 2.4a and 2.6 below
by a "zero" spread at that time.46 David A. Hsieh and Allan W. Kleidon
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Fig. 2.2 Number of quotes per five-minute interval, London and New York
sus those on the International Stock Exchange (ISE) in London (see Burnham
1989,21).
Third, the facts of twenty-four-hour trading and the very size and nature
of the foreign exchange markets suggest that standard models of asymmetric
information may find it difficult to explain persistent temporal patterns since
there may be less systematic private information in these markets compared
with, say, a small NYSE-listed stock that has few followers. Lyons (1995) con-
cludes that interpretation of "information" in the foreign exchange market
must be broader than that in standard models of equity markets since there are
no "insiders" in the foreign exchange market. Our discussion of learning mod-
els in section 2.3 below provides such a broader concept of information.
2.1.2 Results
London and New York: Individual Markets
We first document that volatility in the foreign exchange markets follows
the same U-shaped pattern from the open to the close of trade as on, say, the
NYSE. This is important because it is precisely this result that supports the
conclusions of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Subrahmanyam (1989) that
there is heavy activity by informed traders at the open and close of trade on
the NYSE, which results in the higher variances of returns at those times.
Return variances are calculated as follows. The day is first divided into one-
minute intervals. At the end of each minute, the last quote (bid/ask) is averaged.
If no new quotes occur during that minute, the observation is deleted. Between48 David A. Hsieh and Allan W. Kleidon
two minutes (if both have quotes), the one-minute rate of return is computed
as the discrete rate of change of the average bid/ask between the two minutes.
The standard deviation of each half hour (beginning at 7:30 A.M. local time) is
computed as the standard deviation of these one-minute returns during the in-
terval. For robustness, we present the medians of these half hourly standard
deviations over all days in our sample.
Figures 2.3a and 2.3b plot these average (median) standard deviations per
half hour interval, from 7:30 A.M. (local time) to 6:00 P.M. for London and New
York, respectively. The results are striking. The average variances are much
higher at open and close in both markets than during other times of the trading
day, confirming the apparent U shape in volatility that has been previously
documented in other markets.
1
0 Figures 2.4a and 2.4b present the average
spreads (in pfennig per dollar) by minute over the trading periods indicated
by trading activity in figures 2.1a and 2.1b above for London and New York,
respectively. These figures confirm the general U-shaped pattern of spreads
particularly documented in Bollerslev and Domowitz for smaller regional
banks (1993, 1428ff.).
London and New York: Integrated Markets
Figure 2.5 shows the standard deviations of both London and New York
returns on the same (GMT) time scale. There appears to be no correspondence
between the striking volatility patterns across these two markets, which are
virtually instantaneously linked in terms of quote information.
Not surprisingly given the results in figure 2.5, figure 2.6 shows that changes
in the bid-ask spread documented for London and New York separately do not
provide any coherence when viewed at the same time across markets. While
the average spread is roughly equal in London and New York when both mar-
kets are open, there is no apparent effect of the high spreads associated with
the open or close of one market on the other market.
Table 2.1 presents a test of the difference in spreads between London and
New York, by fifteen-minute intervals from noon GMT to 5:30 P.M. GMT. The
test assumes that samples are uncorrelated, with the result that the f-statistic
for the difference of average spreads in each interval is downward biased if
there is in fact positive correlation across the samples (which would be ex-
pected if information affected both sets of quotes throughout the day). The
results confirm the impressions from figure 2.6 above and demonstrate that the
(indicated) spreads in New York are consistently significantly higher than
those in London, except for London close, when London spreads are higher
10. Note that, since we delete observations if no quote update occurs, and since we require
consecutive observations to calculate a one-minute rate of return, there will be typically fewer
observations for any given time interval than one observation per minute times the number of days
in the sample. In particular, there are fewer observations in our sample at the open and close of
trading than during periods of active trading. Table 2.3 below presents formal tests of the differ-
ences in variances.49 Bid-Ask Spreads in Foreign Exchange Markets
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"Mean spread in London (SLON) and New York (SNY) times 100.
bNumber of observations.
cf-statistic for (SLON - SNY), assuming uncorrelated samples.
than earlier in the London trading day and on average are higher than those in
New York.
Table 2.2 tests for the difference between quote midpoints in London and
New York, as opposed to the spreads. Although table 2.1 above shows that the
indicated spreads in New York are significantly higher than those in London
except at London close, table 2.2 shows that this pattern does not carry over to
mid-quotes. Although on average the London mid-quotes are greater than the
New York mid-quotes, the difference is typically not statistically significant,
at least assuming uncorrelated samples.
Table 2.3 examines the difference between mid-quote to mid-quote vari-
ances for London and New York, again by fifteen-minute intervals beginning
at noon GMT. The results from figure 2.5 above are supported in table 2.3.
From noon until 3:15 P.M., the variance in New York consistently exceeds that
in London with the largest average variances in New York at the start of New
York trading (although not all periods are individually significant at conven-53 Bid-Ask Spreads in Foreign Exchange Markets
























































































































































"Mean mid-quote ([bid + ask]/2) for London (MQLON) and New York (MQNY).
bNumber of observations.
c?-statistic for (MQLON — MQNY), assuming uncorrelated samples.
tional levels based on the conservative assumption of uncorrelated samples).
1
1
However, the variance in London increases toward the close of London trading
and significantly exceeds that in New York in the later part of the London
trading period. The (conservative) ^-statistics are strongly significant at conven-
tional levels in all periods between 4:00 P.M. and 5:30 P.M. (GMT) (the
^-statistics range from 2.64 to 5.53). Even in the last fifteen-minute interval (to
5:45 P.M.) in which there were only twelve observations in London, the
^-statistic is 1.73. Thus, these results clearly document a change in variance in
one market that is not simultaneously observed in the other market.
The cross-market variance results in figure 2.5 and table 2.3 and the cross-
market spread results in figure 2.6 and table 2.1 constitute a challenge for stan-
dard asymmetric information models as applied to foreign exchange data.
11. The earliest intervals in New York (and the latest intervals in London) also have few observa-




























Test of Difference in Mid-Quote to Mid-Quote Variance, London and
































































































































aStandard deviation of mid-quote changes for London (SDLON) and New York (SDNY) times 100.
bNumber of observations.
cf-statistic based on method of moments test for equality of the variances, assuming uncorrelated
samples.
2.2 Current Asymmetric Information Models
This section examines the standard asymmetric information literature as ap-
plied to the open and close of trade in foreign exchange markets. The general
importance of asymmetric information has long been recognized. Bagehot
(1971) argues that the marketmaker loses in trades with better-informed trad-
ers, with the result that trades with uninformed liquidity traders must make
sufficient profit to cover those losses plus costs. This notion is formalized in
subsequent work (see Admati 1991), the most relevant for our current purposes
being Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Subrahmanyam (1989, 1991). Boller-
slev and Domowitz (1993) explicitly interpret much of the foreign exchange




12. Lyons (1993, 1995) develops microstructure models in the context of the foreign exchange
market but does not examine cross-market data as in Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993).55 Bid-Ask Spreads in Foreign Exchange Markets
An initial problem with this literature is an inability of the theoretical model
of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), and the extension of this model by Subrah-
manyam (1989, 1991), simultaneously to account for the observed empirical
phenomena of volume, volatility, and bid-ask spreads on the NYSE (the market
that these models were originally intended to explain).
1
3 We then demonstrate
that the cross-market foreign exchange results from section 2.1 above are in-
consistent with standard asymmetric information models.
2.2.1 Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)
A model of endogenous trading volume is provided by Admati and Pfleid-
erer (1988), who extend Kyle (1984). They assume three types of agents: in-
formed traders, who will trade only on terms advantageous to them given their
superior information; discretionary liquidity traders, who must trade over a
given day but who choose when to trade during the day on the basis of trading
costs (i.e., they trade in those periods of lowest cost); and nondiscretionary
liquidity traders, who must trade at a given time during the day regardless of
cost. In this model, trading costs arise solely because of the activity of the
informed, whose profits are paid by the uninformed liquidity traders.
Given their assumptions, Admati and Pfleiderer show that it is possible to
obtain concentrations of volume at arbitrary trading times because in equilib-
rium these high volume periods attract both informed traders and discretionary
liquidity traders. The informed are attracted because there will be more unin-
formed liquidity traders behind whom they can camouflage their trades. The
discretionary liquidity traders are attracted because, in this model, the in-
creased activity of informed traders implies sufficiently increased competition
among them that the cost of trading to the uninformed is lowered relative to
other periods.
Admati and Pfleiderer relate their results to observed empirical behavior,
especially to volume and variance at the open and close of a day's trading on
the NYSE, and show "that the patterns that have been observed empirically
can be explained in terms of the optimizing decisions of these traders" (1988,
4). Their primary motivation is the high volume and concurrent high variance
at open and close. Volume is explained by their concentration equilibrium out-
lined above; high variance follows directly from the increased activity by in-
formed traders at open and close since more (previously private) information
is thus incorporated into prices.
2.2.2 Subrahmanyam (1989, 1991)
The key result in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)—namely, that increased ac-
tivity by informed traders lowers the costs to the uninformed, who must pay
the price of the presence of the informed—is not intuitively obvious. Subrah-
manyam (1989, 1991) builds on the model of Admati and Pfleiderer and shows
13. Much of this discussion follows Brock and Kleidon (1992, sec. 4.3).56 David A. Hsieh and Allan W. Kleidon
that their result depends on the assumption of risk-neutral informed traders. If
the informed traders are risk averse, then increased activity on their part can
increase the trading costs of liquidity traders. Subrahmanyam (1989, 18) cites
Foster and Viswanathan (1989) as showing that the adverse selection compo-
nent of bid-ask spreads is highest at the beginning of the day, which "contrasts
with the model of Admati and Pfleiderer [1988], which predicts that spreads
should be lowest at the beginning of the day." Brock and Kleidon (1992, sec.
4.1) also provide evidence that appears inconsistent with the key result in Ad-
mati and Pfleiderer since spreads follow the same U shape as volume: highest
volume is associated with highest, not lowest, costs.
1
4
Subrahmanyam (1989) interprets this result as consistent with his extension
of Admati and Pfleiderer to the case of risk-averse informed traders since then
more trading by informed traders results in lower market liquidity and higher
costs. To do this, he requires the additional assumption that "more individuals
are informed at the beginning of the day than at other times during the day" (p.
17). For this model to be a full explanation of the relation between spreads
and volume, he presumably requires that the informed also trade more heavily
at close.
2.2.3 Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993)
Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993) examine the same data as in this paper,
namely, continuously recorded quotes on the deutsche mark/dollar exchange
rate in the interbank foreign exchange market. They document quote arrivals
and bid-ask spreads over the trading day, across geographic locations, and
across trading participants. The analytic focus is on two main areas: first
(which is most relevant for this paper), an evaluation of the predictions of the
asymmetric information models of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Subrah-
manyam (1989) and, second, time-series modeling of means and conditional
variances.
Bollerslev and Domowitz conclude that their evidence "is encouraging with
respect to the ability to validate and discriminate between theoretical models
of trading activity using intraday information on foreign exchange trading"
(1993, 1439). They suggest that periodic nondiscretionary liquidity trading
around open and close will intensify the results of Admati and Pfleiderer, while
round-the-clock trading will weaken them, and conclude that the U-shaped
patterns of trading activity from open through close, well documented for the
14. The model of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Subrahmanyam (1989, 1991) assumes se-
quential batch auctions rather than the continuous auctions associated with bids and asks on the
NYSE. However, Admati and Pfleiderer regard their results as applying to the volume behavior on
the NYSE, and Subrahmanyam (1989) explicitly equates the costs in Admati and Pfleiderer (which
are the same as in his model) with bid-ask spreads. We follow this approach. Further, as Grossman
and Miller (1988,628) point out, transactions costs should be measured by the difference between
the price paid now and the price expected to be paid by waiting; but, if the average spread falls
after opening and rises at close, one would expect a priori that a given liquidity trader would
expect higher transactions costs in such periods.57 Bid-Ask Spreads in Foreign Exchange Markets
NYSE and addressed by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), is apparent only in the
European markets (p. 1426, n. 8).
Bollerslev and Domowitz also find that, for traders who restrict their trading
to regional markets within well-defined openings and closings (as opposed to
international firms with traders in multiple regional markets), the activity pat-
tern (quote volume) "typically shows a U-shape, as does the distribution of
their own spreads over the course of the day" (1993, 1428). Since these traders
"operate more like the stock market traders usually modeled in much of the
theoretical literature, with behavior influenced by openings and closings"
(p. 1429), Bollerslev and Domowitz interpret this evidence as confirming the
model of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), although they note that the "daily pat-
terns of the spread and market activity suggest risk-averse behavior on the part
of these traders" (p. 1439). This modification is tied to "Subrahmanyam's
(1989) extension of the Admati and Pfleiderer model to include risk-averse
behavior [that] predicts that more trading by informed risk-averse participants
brings about higher costs" (p. 1426, n. 9).
2.2.4 Foreign Exchange Quote Data and Standard Information Models
We conclude that the asymmetric information models of Admati and
Pfleiderer and Subrahmanyam are not consistent with the foreign exchange
data on spreads and volatility, for two reasons. First, close examination of Su-
brahmanyam's extension of the Admati-Pfleiderer model shows that, although
he can account for high spreads at times of high informed trading, the cost
is that he loses the major result of the Admati-Pfleiderer model, namely, the
concentrated trading equilibrium relied on by Admati and Pfleiderer to account
for simultaneous high volume and high volatility. Second, the results from sec-
tion 2.1 above show that volatilities (and spreads) across markets that trade
simultaneously do not show the congruence implied by either the Admati-
Pfleiderer or the Subrahmanyam models.
On the first point, note that Subrahmanyam's model implies that discretion-
ary liquidity traders who can time their trades will avoid the high-cost, high-
volume periods that he links to high levels of informed trading. However, this
breaks the concentration of trading relied on in Admati and Pfleiderer's equilib-
rium. This in turn makes it difficult to explain the observed high volume in
terms of discretionary liquidity traders and informed traders, since the former
will avoid the high-cost open and close and the number of informed traders
must be "sufficiently small" (Subrahmanyam 1989, p. 18) for the result to go
through. Further, were the increased volume due to a very large increase in the
number of informed traders (sufficient both to offset the departure of discre-
tionary liquidity traders and to account for the total increase in volume), one
wonders who takes the other side of their trades, especially since they receive
correlated signals in this model.
Presumably, the burden falls, once again, on the luckless nondiscretionary
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trade at these times regardless of price or cost. That is, the empirical results on
spreads and volume—which the Admati-Pfleiderer and Subrahmanyam mod-
els attempt to explain—imply that within those models there must be an in-
crease in nondiscretionary liquidity trading at open and close sufficient to off-
set the departure of discretionary traders in the face of higher transactions
costs. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988, 34) conjecture that the orders of nondiscre-
tionary traders may cluster around open and close because of market closure;
however, this is not part of their formal model, and they rely on such periodic
demand as simply a timing catalyst for their endogenous clustering that re-
quires low trading costs at open and close to attract discretionary traders.
The second problem with these asymmetric information models relates to
the cross-market results from section 2.1 above. These results show that the
observed behavior in spreads and variances cannot be explained within stan-
dard information models. It is true that, looking at the two markets individually,
the variance results appear similar to those from the NYSE used to motivate
the asymmetric information model of Admati and Pfleiderer. At first blush,
then, these results may appear to provide confirmation of the conclusion that
activity at the open and close of trading in foreign exchange markets is heavily
influenced by concentrations of informed traders at those times, resulting in
high variances.
The results obtained from looking at London and New York separately are
highly misleading, however, in terms of evidence concerning any tracks left in
the data by privately informed traders. Recall that these quotes appear directly
on the Reuters' screens of traders in all locations. Assume that the high vari-
ance (and high spread) at close of trade in London is indeed caused by an
unusually high concentration of informed traders at that time, which in turn
causes rapid changes in quotes and, consequently, high variance. Traders in
New York observe directly and simultaneously these London quote revisions
that are ostensibly caused by the incorporation of previously private informa-
tion. Since the commodity is the same whether the quotes are posted in London
or New York, it must be the case that the incorporation of new information into
the London quotes must virtually simultaneously show up in New York quotes,
resulting in simultaneous high variance in New York quotes.
The results in table 2.3 and figure 2.5 above clearly refute this implication.
Note that the New York opening—which is ostensibly replete with private in-
formation, causing the New York variance of returns to rise dramatically—
causes scarcely a ripple on the London market! Similarly, the London market
closes with dramatic local effects in terms of variance but with no effect on
New York. Similarly, table 2.1 and figure 2.6 above show an apparent lack of
integration across these two markets with respect to spreads.
2.3 Evaluation of Results
We regard the results from section 2.2 as striking evidence that, whatever is
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in the foreign exchange market, it is not the incorporation of previously private
information through the heavy trading of informed traders at the open and
close of trading in London and New York. This is particularly evident from the
comparison of volatility patterns across London and New York in figure 2.5
and table 2.3 above.
We consider two main alternative explanations for these results. First, we
consider a broader class of information models that has recently been proposed
to explain related forms of apparent excess volatility in stock prices, namely,
models that relax the assumption in standard information models that traders
have perfect knowledge about the preferences and beliefs of other traders in
the market. These new models, based on imperfect information aggregation
and subsequent learning by market participants, can be linked to experimental
results in the behavioral literature and have proved successful in accounting for
such difficult phenomena as the crash of October 1987. The second explana-
tion that we consider, which is particularly relevant for behavior at the close of
a market, returns to inventory models such as Garman (1976).
2.3.1 Models of Imperfect Information Aggregation: The Open of Trade
Our results at the open of New York and the close of London trading show
that no new information is reaching the international foreign exchange market
as a whole since there is an absence of unusual volatility in quotes generated
by traders in London when New York opens and, conversely, at London close.
One way to view these results is that quotes generated by traders in the volatile
market show excess volatility relative to that implied by standard information
models.
Others have noted the difficulty in explaining foreign exchange data in terms
of standard information models. For example, Frankel and Froot (1990) em-
phasize heterogeneity of expectations across traders in foreign exchange mar-
kets and suggest three possible implications of the high trading volume in these
markets for price movements: (1) greater depth means more efficient pro-
cessing of fundamental information; (2) there is no relation between trading
volume and prices since the market is "already perfectly efficient"; and
(3) there may be "excessive volatility" caused by trading based on "noise"
rather than "news" (p. 182). Frankel and Rose (1994) explore the third possi-
bility in some detail, with emphasis on the possibility of "endogenous specula-
tive bubbles" in foreign exchange markets.
The special nature of our cross-market data implies a high hurdle for poten-
tial explanations since such an explanation must account for both the system-
atic behavior within markets and the lack of congruence across markets around
open and close. Thus, for example, if the explanation is to be "noise" rather
than "news," it appears that London is not affected by noise when New York
opens with high volatility; but at London close, the roles are reversed, with
London displaying high volatility but New York now immune from any noise
affecting London. This appears to be more complicated than is implied by the
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ing currently applied to foreign exchange markets such as Lewis (1989a,
1989b).
One recent approach that shows promise in this context focuses on imper-
fect, although rational, information aggregation.
1
5 There are two extreme views
on price formation. One assumes that all private information is instantly aggre-
gated and revealed to market participants through prices. The other assumes
that price changes are capricious and irrational. One attempt to find a middle
ground assumes that prices are formed as some average of these two types of
behavior, an approach similar to the noise-trading models cited in Frankel and
Rose (1994, 37). The approach of imperfect information aggregation also sup-
plies a middle ground between the extremes, but in a very different way.
It is well known from behavioral laboratory experiments that, under certain
conditions, asset prices can be readily generated that display systematic devia-
tions from those predicted by fully revealing rational expectations models.
These deviations display both apparent excess volatility and the characteristics
often associated with speculative bubbles. The conditions needed to generate
these phenomena in experimental laboratories are revealing: market partici-
pants must lack common knowledge about other traders' preferences or be-
liefs, or there must be insufficient traded instruments to theoretically allow
traders to invert from prices to infer information. Significantly, if traders have
common knowledge about preferences and beliefs, then the consistent result is
that prices quickly converge to the fully revealing rational expectations equi-
librium if there are sufficient traded assets given the sources of information
uncertainty and if the traders have trading experience in the market.
1
6
While standard information models typically assume common information
among market participants about traders' preferences and beliefs, we regard
this assumption as unrealistic in many settings, including the foreign exchange
market. When traders first begin trading at the open of their local market, a
commonly described issue is that they need to get the "feel" of the market at
that time.
1
7 The most important elements of this "feel" are the participants in
the market at that point in time and what their trading behavior has been in the
immediately prior trading period.
Clearly, current prices are not sufficient statistics for these items. Traders
attempt to obtain this information by contacting traders who have been trading
for some time; for example, New York traders will have contacts in London
(not necessarily in the same bank) whom they will call to obtain a sense of the
current market. Our interpretation of this phenomenon is consistent with the
importance of knowledge about the preferences and beliefs of other traders to
allow information aggregation across traders. In the more limited view of an
15. For a detailed discussion of this approach, see Kleidon (1995). This general approach has
been examined in the context of foreign exchange markets by Crnja (1993).
16. For details, see Kleidon (1995, sec. 2).
17. This is not restricted to the foreign exchange market. This phenomenon has been consis-
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individual trader, the question is the interpretation of current trading behavior
in the market. For example, is a request for a bid on a certain sized trade likely
to be followed by the same trader for another? If so, then that will affect the
terms offered for the first trade.
Significantly, traders report that, until they have got the feel of the market,
they are uncertain of their "view" and hence, for example, of whether they will
be going long or short one or another currency in their early trading during the
day. This translates into initial high spreads, with rapidly changing quotes as
traders develop their view for the current trading period.
This, of course, appears to correspond to the evidence that we presented in
section 2.1 above at the open of trade. The market that has been trading for
some time (London, at New York open) does not show any "excess volatility"
relative to surrounding times, and the new traders (in New York) rapidly get
the feel of the market, that is, assimilate important information about the cur-
rent market structure that is not contained in the current price. While there is
little documented evidence about the mechanisms that traders use to get the
feel of the market, conversations with traders indicate that they include perusal
of overnight information from various sources beyond the trading history of
the particular currency being traded, as well as more formal arrangements with
counterparts at overseas banks who agree to provide specific information about
the market to the "novice" who is just starting to trade. One possibility consis-
tent with our data (and not addressed by standard information models) is that
the new dealers set wide spreads while they gather this information and then
narrow the spreads once they are ready to trade.
However formal or informal the mechanism for obtaining information about
the market structure, the level of spreads and the volatility of quotes settle
down once traders get the feel of the market, and the markets trade in an inte-
grated fashion until the next major disruption—the close of trading on one of
the markets.
2.3.2 Inventory-Based Models: Close of Trade
A large proportion of foreign exchange trading, including most of that done
by smaller, regional banks, is "day trading," in which traders start and end the
day with flat positions. While this does not cause any particular problems at
the start of the day since positions can be accumulated during the trading day
that has just begun, the inventory problem for day traders becomes increasingly
acute as the close of trading approaches. In the limit, a trader who must close
out a position by the end of the day has increasingly inelastic demand to trade




18. Brock and Kleidon (1992) exploit differences in trading demand at open and close to predict
higher spreads at these times if a marketmaker such as a monopolist specialist has the ability to
price discriminate at these times of inelastic demand to trade. This idea may have some application
in foreign exchange markets, particularly with respect to quotes by regional banks to customers
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The effects of inventory on prices and quotes are well discussed in market
microstructure literature beginning with Garman (1976) (see also Amihud and
Mendelson 1980; Ho and Stoll 1981, 1983; O'Hara and Oldfield 1986; and
Son 1991). Recent empirical work in equity dealer markets in London (see
Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan 1993) and the United States (see Chan, Chris-
tie, and Schultz 1995) documents strong inventory effects, and Lyons (1995)
documents inventory effects in the foreign exchange market. Discussions with
traders in the foreign exchange market confirm that high quote volatility and
spreads at close are linked by traders to the activities of day traders who are




In this paper, we have explored the implications of foreign exchange markets
for alternate models of intraday price and volume behavior. There are empirical
difficulties in reconciling current asymmetric information models with stock
price data in individual markets, but it is possible for some form of these mod-
els to be consistent with NYSE prices and volume, assuming that liquidity
traders have strong demand to trade at open and close for reasons that are not
motivated within the information models. Our choice of the foreign exchange
market is motivated by the ability to test whether any form of the current asym-
metric information models can explain prices and volumes in this market.
The advantages of foreign exchange data are that the market extends around
the clock and that traders from any location have equal access via computer
terminal to the posted quotes of all traders from all locations. If new informa-
tion is the cause for revisions in quotes for traders in, say, London, then those
quote revisions are immediately indicated to all other traders. Moreover, since
there is an overlap between the trading days of traders in London and New
York, we can observe whether the quote behavior is integrated in the fashion
implied by the asymmetrical information models.
The results are inconsistent with these models. If London and New York are
examined individually, they display the same patterns of spread and volatility
from "open" to "close" as does the NYSE, which may indicate similar forces
in each market. However, when New York foreign exchange traders begin their
day, with attendant high volatility and spreads, London has been trading for
hours and is still trading. There is no effect on London quotes, in either volatil-
ity or spreads, of the striking New York quote behavior. Similarly, although
London "closes" its day with high variances and high spreads, this does not
cause a ripple on the quotes of New York traders. This is inconsistent with
standard sources of asymmetric information being the fundamental cause of
this behavior.
19. A related feature of the New York close is the decrease in depth of the market as traders
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Our primary conclusion is that the current models of asymmetric informa-
tion appear inadequate to explain our results. This raises questions concerning
their application in other markets as well. Indeed, our findings are not limited
to quotes in the foreign exchange market. Kleidon and Werner (in press) dem-
onstrate that similar results apply to U.K. stocks that are cross-listed on Lon-
don and New York exchanges and that consequently trade simultaneously in a
similar fashion to the foreign exchange trading that we document here. It ap-
pears that we must turn to explanations other than current information models
if we are to account for the behavior of prices and volumes in both stock and
foreign exchange markets.
We suggest two possible explanations for the empirical results documented
in section 2.1. First, we place importance at the open of trade on learning by
traders about the structure of the market, particularly concerning the identity
and behavior of other traders. This can be linked both to behavioral experimen-
tal results and to the results in recent literature that examines the implications
for information aggregation of a lack of common knowledge among traders
concerning the preferences and beliefs of market participants. During the pe-
riod when traders pursue various mechanisms to learn the feel of the market,
spreads may be set sufficiently wide to avoid trading at an informational dis-
advantage.
Second, at the close of trade, much of the activity in the closing market
documented in section 2.1 may be due to the inventory-related activities of
traders at market close, especially for the large group of day traders who must
close their positions by the end of trading.
While these explanations seem plausible—and indeed are confirmed by for-
eign currency traders—further investigation is warranted.
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Comment Zhaohui Chen
In this paper, Hsieh and Kleidon begin with a precise description of the state of
the "market microstructure literature." They remind the readers of the original
definition of market microstructure by Mark Garman (1976) and summarize
the current dominating paradigm in the literature—the asymmetric informa-
tion models in the line of Admati (1991), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), and
others. This introduction is useful to exchange rate researchers attempting to
exploit microstructure models. It serves as a warning that, given its narrow
focus, we should not expect this literature to give us answers to all the macro-
economic puzzles related to foreign exchange rates. On the bright side, this
paper has made a welcome attempt to expand the current literature with alter-
native paradigms. A broader intellectual base may well be what we need to
understand the behavior of the foreign exchange market.
The empirical evidence amassed in the paper clearly indicates that the open-
ing and closing of New York and London markets seem to be local events. The
associated trading activity and volatility do not transmit from one location to
the other, even though the two markets are open to trade at the same time.
This evidence could be interpreted in two different ways. First, the asymmetric
information model may be wrong, in the sense that private information associ-
ated with high volatility in one market is not picked up by the other market.
Given the simultaneity of information processing on the Reuters screen in the
two markets, and given that currencies are the most standardized vehicle of
trade, this interpretation does not stand well. This leads to the second interpre-
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tation: the unusual market activities around the opening and closing of the
markets are not driven by private information. Under this interpretation, the
evidence should not be seen as a rejection of the asymmetric information
model since the events used are not information driven and therefore cannot
be used to test the information transmission story behind the Admati and
Pfleiderer-type models. However, the evidence and the institutional analysis
in the paper unambiguously show that the conventional asymmetric model is
not applicable to the problems of this paper. This is an important message since
it proves, by counterexamples, that the currently dominating paradigm in the
microstructure literature is inadequate to cover a possibly broad array of issues
in the foreign exchange market.
The second half of the paper explores different paradigms, including the
traditional inventory models and the new models of learning. At this stage,
most of the learning models are based on experimental results. Nevertheless,
it would be extremely interesting if the authors, or future researchers, could
apply their econometric tools to test the applicability of such theories and to
provide evidence that can help validate different assumptions behind the new
theories.
Following the discussion of the learning models in the paper, I would like
to raise two questions. One is what the traders try to learn in the process; the
other is whether there is a welfare gain from learning. Regarding the first ques-
tion, the paper mentioned specific parameters such as preferences and beliefs
and the ambiguous notion of the "feel" of the market. One possible explanation
is that traders need to learn each other's trading rule, or asset valuation scheme,
and even the theories behind them, as they do not want to be the outliers in the
market. They can do that by testing each other's reaction to various quotes,
hence the large number of quotes and high volatility from the screen data
around the opening of the market. Regarding the second question, my hypothe-
sis is that a pricing rule formed through consultation with other market partici-
pants is more likely to be correct (in absolute terms) than a simple average of
other people's quotes (the whole is larger than the sum of the parts). This point
is illustrated plainly (or mysteriously) in the popular management experimen-
tal game known as "Desert Survival Game," where a group of people are asked
to form a survival strategy after an imaginary plane crash in a desert. The group
decision following a full consultation among the group members is almost
always better than the simple average of individual opinions before the consul-
tation.
Finally, the use of the Reuters quote data in this paper is open to question in
light of the recent study by Goodhart, Ito, and Payne (chap. 4 in this volume),
in which they find no linkage between these quotes and real trading activities
as captured by a more up-to-date data screen. Given the dismissal of the private
information story, the problem is less damaging to this paper because, as the
later part of the paper suggests, there may be different reasons leading to the67 Bid-Ask Spreads in Foreign Exchange Markets
use of quotes, such as learning and testing ("feeling") the market, that are not
necessarily linked to actual trading activities.
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Comment Antti Suvanto
The authors make the empirical observation that volatility of the deutsche
mark/dollar exchange rate and the spread are high at both the open and the
close of the trading day. This U-shaped pattern is evident for both New York
and London. Because of time-zone differences, London opens when New York
is still closed. When New York opens, London still has a few hours to go.
The second observation made in the paper is that the higher volatility and
wider spread in New York at the time of opening are in no way reflected in the
volatility and spread in the London market. Similarly, the higher volatility and
wider spread at the time London closes do not affect midday volatility and
spread in New York.
These observations seem to contradict predictions of recent microstructure
theory based on asymmetric information between informed insiders and li-
quidity traders. This theory has been used to explain the similar U-shaped in-
traday pattern of the volatility and the spread in organized securities markets,
such as the New York Stock Exchange.
The authors argue that, because the foreign exchange market is globally in-
tegrated and the object of trade the most homogeneous of all, the participation
of informed traders at the beginning of the trading day in New York should be
visible in London as well. Therefore, the spread should widen and the volatility
increase at the same time in both markets. The same should be true if informed
trading in London is concentrated toward the end of the trading day. Because
this is not the case, the asymmetric information argument is not applicable to
the foreign exchange market.
The authors suggest two types of explanations for these observations. The
first is based on the heterogeneity of information across marketmakers. The
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second is based on the inventory (position) adjustment behavior of "day trad-
ers." I find these suggestive explanations plausible, and I agree with
the authors' final conclusion that further investigation along these lines is
warranted.
Position Constraint
Let us take the inventory argument first. The authors point out that a large
proportion of foreign exchange trading is "day trading," by which they mean
that the banks open and close the day with closed positions. I am not sure
whether it is accurate to refer to smaller regional banks alone in this context
because all banks, including branches of the big international banks, are "day
traders." They stop trading at some point in the day, whether their overnight
position is open or not. Otherwise, there would not be distinct but overlapping
trading days in London and New York.
The point made by the authors is, however, relevant. The fact that important
news may be disclosed during the time when the bank is not trading and the
fact that trading continues in other time zones imply that the dealers must pay
attention to overnight positions. As the trading day winds down, dealers must
either close a position or aim at a desired fixed open position. Whatever the
position target for the end of the day, the problem of achieving this target be-
comes increasingly acute toward the end of the trading day, as the authors cor-
rectly point out.
I have shown elsewhere that this is true in a partial equilibrium model of the
pricing behavior of an isolated profit-maximizing marketmaker facing stochas-
tic but price-sensitive order flow from uninformed customers and aiming at
a closed position or at any other fixed position target for the end of the day
(Suvanto 1993, chap. 2).
Applying dynamic programming techniques, the resulting sequential pric-
ing rule implies weak efficiency of the mid-rate and low-volatility of prices
(relative to the volatility of order flow) during the most of the day, with volatil-
ity increasing toward the end of the day. The spread is chosen so as to maximize
the expected trading income at each short trading period given the price sensi-
tivity of customer orders.
The reluctance of the dealer to make frequent and drastic changes in the
quoted two-way price in the absence of new information derives from the fact
that such changes are generally revenue reducing, that is, selling at a low price
a currency just purchased at a high price. Note that in this model the binding
two-way price is set before the direction and size of the trade are known. The
counterpart to small price adjustments is the dealer's willingness to accept
comparatively large open intraday positions. In fact, the ex ante position vari-
ance increases at the beginning of the day and starts to decline toward the end
of the day.
Although the environmental assumptions of this (monopolist) model are far
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market of today, the results can be generalized to a more realistic setting. Open-
ing the model to competition and interdealer transactions makes the quotation
of an individual dealer dependent on the price quotes of others and narrows
the spread. From the position-adjustment point of view, the life of an individual
dealer is easier because he can undo an unwanted position by calling another
marketmaker or he can stay on the "right side of the market" and attract orders
from other dealers by making a very small price adjustment.
This is true for the most of the day, but the mechanism does not work in the
same way just before the close. Dealers who are already satisfied with their
positions do not want new orders. Widening the spread decreases the likeli-
hood of new orders. There may be unwanted open positions that do not find
buyers until the spread is sufficiently large to make the price attractive to some-
body, or sufficiently unattractive to the seller, until either of them is willing to
carry an open overnight position.
Allowing for overlapping time zones eliminates this problem because deal-
ers in a closing time zone can sell unwanted open positions to buyers in open
time zones. Dealers in the latter are happy to buy these positions because they
are on the "right side of the market" and have plenty of time to undo the posi-
tion during the remainder of the day.
Heterogeneous Information
Let us now turn to the heterogeneity of information. Information may be
heterogeneous even if all participants have the same information but interpret
its significance for the exchange rate somewhat differently. Economists very
often have the same information. Yet they may permanently disagree on the
interpretation. Could one reasonably expect dealers always to have a uniform
interpretation of the remainder of the day?
The authors point out correctly that dealers need to get the "feel" of the
market before engaging in active trading. What does this feel mean?
Assume that at the time of the London opening all dealers have the same
information on the macroeconomic and political news that has been reported
since the previous close and that they have the same expectations about news
that is forthcoming during the day. Assume further that each dealer knows with
probability one that all nonbank customers that may appear during the day
are price-sensitive liquidity traders. These rather extreme assumptions should
eliminate all information asymmetries at the beginning of the day, but this is
not the case.
Depending on the situation, each dealer acts in two different roles in relation
to his interbank counterparties. Sometimes he is on the "right side" of the mar-
ket and acts as a marketmaker in relation to another dealer who is requesting
a quote. On other occasions, he is on the "wrong side" of the market, re-
questing a quote from someone else.
Each time dealer A quotes a two-way price to another dealer, B, he does not
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know whether at the very same moment his dealer-customer B is receiving
from dealer C a price that is inconsistent with his own quote in the sense that
his ask price is below the bid price quoted by dealer C (or vice versa). If this
is the case, there is an arbitrage opportunity for dealer B, who would never
leave such an opportunity unexploited.
I have argued elsewhere that the possibility of inconsistent quotes cannot be
eliminated entirely as long as two-way prices are quoted independently with-
out full knowledge of all other quotes at the same moment (Suvanto 1993,
chap. 3). This brings potential insiders into the picture because some partici-
pants may have observed a pair of inconsistent prices. This explains the posi-
tive bid-ask spread in the same way as the possibility of informed traders ex-
plains the positive spread in the stock market. Fundamental valuation
efficiency plays no role in this context.
A dealer who has a given interpretation of the significance of publicly avail-
able information on the exchange rate during the remainder of the day may
take a position based on this view by asking a price from another dealer and
transacting accordingly, but he does not make a large adjustment to his own
price immediately if he is not absolutely sure that all other marketmakers have
already made a similar price adjustment. If he did, he might receive unwanted
orders because his quote might be inconsistent with prices quoted by others.
Rather, he is likely to widen the spread in order to reduce the likelihood of
such an occurrence.
It is plausible to assume that dealers opening their screens in the morning
have different outlooks for the remainder of the day even in the absence of any
private inside information. Dealers are cautious not to start the day with a price
far out of line with other quotes, which explains the wide spread. But with a
wide spread there is little or no trading and hence little or no trading profit.
Therefore, the dealers are eager to start trading as soon as possible, which
explains the rapid convergence of the spreads to the level that makes active
trading possible. Once established, the "feel" of the market is maintained be-
cause the prices and the spreads can be constantly tested in active trading.
The short period during which the "feel" of the market is established in an
opening time zone need not affect prices quoted in a time zone where the
markets are soon to close, provided there is sufficient overlapping. Dealers in
the opening zone may get attractive quotes from the soon-to-close zone, where
some dealers may get rid of their remaining positions at an attractive price.
In addition, sufficient overlapping provides dealers in the soon-to-close zone
sufficient time to wait until the "feel" is established in the opening zone.
Additional Remarks
The paper marks an opening to a new area of research, that is, the intermar-
ket connections across overlapping time zones. It would be interesting to have
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spread and volatility at closing time in Continental Europe might also be illu-
minating.
The data are based on indicative quotations from the Reuters' screen
(FXFX), which do not give the actual transaction prices or trade volume. As
the authors point out, it would be useful to check the results using alternative
and more accurate sources of information.
As the data reveal, the changeover from the opening phase, when dealers
are getting the "feel" of the market, to active trading takes place in a relatively
short span of time. It is more or less over by the time corporate treasurers and
other nondealer customers step in and begin to request prices. Similarly, most
of the nonbank customers have probably already disappeared when, shortly
before closing, the spread widens and the volatility increases.
This raises the question of the role of nonbank customers in the foreign
exchange market. Despite the high proportion of interdealer trade, nondealer
customers may be needed after all to maintain the depth of the market. Other-
wise, how would dealers in the aggregate earn their trading income over the
long run?
Reference
Suvanto, A. 1993. Foreign exchange dealing: Essays on the microstructure of the for-
eign exchange market. Helsinki: Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA).